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Executive Summary
Even under newly revised federal enforcement policies issued in the summer and fall of 2011,
Secure Communities continues to lead to the deportation of people who have no criminal
convictions or who are themselves crime victims; people convicted of minor, non-violent crimes
such as traffic offenses; and people with old convictions for crimes, but who are rehabilitated
and pose no danger to their communities.
Secure Communities authorizes the sharing of information between local and federal authorities
for the stated purpose of identifying and deporting “criminal aliens.” Very soon after the
program’s inception in 2008, however, localities began to report that the vast majority of people
deported under the program were not violent criminals. The localities also pointed out that the
program forced them to internalize significant costs, including (1) the financial costs of
detaining people in local jails before they are transferred to ICE custody; (2) harm to community
policing because of the fear that any contact with police—even by a crime victim or witness
calling 911—could lead to deportation; and (3) harm to the families of people deported through
the program, which frequently include children and other relatives who are United States
citizens. In addition, reports indicate that Secure Communities has led to the increased use of
racial profiling in policing.
This white paper analyzes the contrast between the federal government’s representation of
Secure Communities and the reality of the program’s implementation in Los Angeles County
through interviews with individual immigrant detainees and available aggregate data. The
interviews and data suggest that ICE’s failure to adhere to its own stated priorities is a feature
rather than a reparable flaw of the program. The program has been constructed and
implemented on the assumption that if an individual has any contact with law enforcement—
even if that contact stems from a traffic offense—that individual represents a threat to the
community. ICE uses its stated criminal priorities as part of a rhetorical strategy to assuage the
concerns of states and localities. In operation, however, ICE casts a wide net and offers little
relief to worthy candidates for prosecutorial discretion; the vast majority of those deported
through Secure Communities have merely had contact with local law enforcement and have not
committed serious crimes.
The use of local police to identify and deport people who have not been convicted of serious
crimes is an essential—though generally unstated—feature of Secure Communities. We
recommend that the County of Los Angeles protect itself from the deficiencies of the Secure
Communities program by adopting an ordinance limiting its participation, following
jurisdictions such as Arlington County, Virginia; Cook County, Illinois; and Santa Clara County,
California.
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I.

HISTORY OF SECURE COMMUNITIES
A.

Origin and Operation

Secure Communities is a deportation program introduced by the Bush administration in 2008,
and expanded under the Obama administration. For several decades before Secure
Communities, local police officers checked the fingerprints of all arrested individuals against a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) database to determine if the individuals had outstanding
warrants in other jurisdictions. Under Secure Communities, however, the FBI sends those
fingerprints to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), part of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). If ICE believes that the individual is undocumented or otherwise
deportable, or if ICE wishes to initiate an investigation into the individual’s deportability, it
issues a “detainer” to the local police department. These detainers—also referred to as
“immigration holds” or “ICE holds”—request that local police continue to detain the individual
until ICE agents interview and determine whether or not to transfer the individual to ICE
custody. ICE issues the detainer at the time of the individual’s arrest; no past or current
conviction is required for ICE to issue a detainer. According to ICE, the purpose of this
additional detention is to allow ICE agents to interview the individual.
In theory, these detainers should last no longer than 48 hours, in addition to any weekends and
holidays, though in practice detainers may last much longer.1 Even if the detainer lasts 48 hours
or less, however, people with a detainer tend to stay in jail much longer than similarly situated
people without a detainer.2 This is because police often refuse to accept bail from people who
have ICE detainers, and because people with detainers are often denied access to alternative-toincarceration programs. Local jurisdictions bear the cost of the prolonged detention, whether it
is a result of a detainer or a prolonged jail stay.
B.

ICE’s Stated Priorities

ICE has always stated that the purpose of Secure Communities is to remove “criminal aliens,”
though it never defined in precise terms who should be designated as such. In 2009,
emphasizing that “criminal aliens pose a threat to security in our communities,” ICE described
the program as an “ICE initiative that focuses on the identification and removal of aliens who
are convicted of a serious criminal offense and are subject to removal.”3 In other words, ICE
framed Secure Communities as a tool to help the agency identify non-citizens previously
convicted of serious crimes, and who therefore threaten the safety of their communities.
However, ICE has broadened its net to include those merely charged with—and never convicted
of—its target criminal offenses. This change is clear in ICE’s monthly statistics reports, which
lump together people “charged with or convicted of” various categories of offenses.4 The
distinction between these two categories of people is crucial; ICE counts people who have been
convicted of crimes in the same group as people who have merely faced charges in the past—
even if those charges were dropped because the police or prosecutor no longer believed the
individual was responsible. This categorization highlights the reality that Secure Communities
3
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punishes with deportation both those who are convicted of crimes and those against whom
charges have been dropped.
C.

Implementation

ICE piloted Secure Communities in October 2008 in 14 jurisdictions. As ICE sought state
partners, it made clear that implementation of Secure Communities at the local level required
two steps: (1) execution of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the state; and (2) signed
statements of intent from county and local agencies.5
ICE’s MOA template explained that it was the program’s goal to “identify, detain and remove
aliens convicted of a serious criminal offense,” thus “improving community safety.” The MOA
would remain in effect only “until terminated by either party.”6 With those assurances, many
states entered into MOAs to implement the program.
ICE moved quickly to spread Secure Communities across the country in a relatively short period
of time. California signed an MOA authorizing the implementation of the program on April 10,
2009, and the program was implemented in Los Angeles on August 27, 2009. As of November
15, 2011, Secure Communities had extended into 1,688 jurisdictions in 44 states and territories.
ICE now states that it plans to implement the program nationwide by 2013.7
D.

Local Pushback

As Secure Communities spread, it became clear that the vast majority of those deported through
the program were not violent criminals, and often had no criminal convictions at all. At the same
time, ICE began “activating” the program in local jurisdictions without first obtaining signed
statements of intent from counties and localities, violating a premise on which many states had
entered into MOAs. A number of states and localities complained that the reality of the
program’s implementation did not match its stated goals, and that they were being forced into a
controversial program without their consent.
Several localities—including Arlington, Santa Clara, San Francisco, and others—sought to opt
out of the program, requesting information on how to do so from DHS. On September 7, 2010,
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano clarified in a letter to Representative Zoe Lofgren that even
after a state enters into an MOA to implement Secure Communities, local law enforcement
agencies could opt out of the program simply by formally notifying ICE of that intent.8 A
corresponding section on the ICE website spelled out those instructions in greater detail:
If a jurisdiction does not wish to activate on its scheduled date in the Secure Communities
deployment plan, it must formally notify its state identification bureau and ICE in writing (email,
letter or facsimile). Upon receipt of that information, ICE will request a meeting with federal
partners, the jurisdiction, and the state to discuss any issues and come to a resolution, which may
include adjusting the jurisdiction’s activation date in or removing the jurisdiction from the
deployment plan.9
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Following that representation, the County of Santa Clara Board of Supervisors unanimously
voted on September 28, 2010, to opt out of Secure Communities. In explaining his vote,
Chairperson George Shirakawa stated, “this program does not make any community in our
County safer, because it creates fear among our residents and prevents them from reporting
crime.”10
On that same day, the County of Arlington, Virginia, passed a similar resolution opting out of
Secure Communities. The resolution stated that “public safety depends on the ability of
[Arlington County] residents to interact with . . . local law enforcement authorities without fear
due to actual or perceived race, national origin, ethnicity, or immigration status.”11
ICE responded by removing the “opt-out” instructions from its website at some point in October
2010. Secretary Napolitano then began to contradict her earlier representation, stating that “we
do not view this as an opt-in, opt-out program.”12
Nevertheless, on May 3, 2011 the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department issued a memorandum
announcing a policy that would implement that city’s Sanctuary City ordinance with respect to
Secure Communities, beginning the following month. The memorandum stated that ICE
detainer requests are merely requests, and do not impose a legal mandate to hold a person in
custody. As a result, the Sheriff’s Department would honor the detainer requests only in limited
circumstances, focusing on individuals with convictions for a limited set of crimes.13
On May 4, 2011, the Illinois State Police formally terminated its memorandum of understanding
with ICE implementing Secure Communities in Illinois. That agreement had been in effect since
November 2009. In his letter to Marc Rapp, Acting Assistant Director of Secure Communities,
Illinois Governor Pat Quinn cited statistics that less than 20 percent of those deported from
Illinois under the program had ever been convicted of a serious crime, and more than 30
percent had never been convicted of any crime. Governor Quinn concluded that Illinois would
no longer participate in the program because of “the conflict between the stated purpose of
Secure Communities and the implementation of the program.”14
The next day, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus sent a letter to President Obama requesting
“an immediate freeze” of Secure Communities pending a thorough review of the program. The
letter cited national statistics that “79 percent of individuals deported through S-Comm either
lacked any criminal record or have been convicted of only minor offenses, including traffic
violations.” The letter also expressed concern that the program had led to racial profiling, as
evidenced by the fact that “rates of non-criminal deportations appear to vary widely between
jurisdictions.”15
On May 26, 2011, the California Assembly passed the TRUST Act by a 47 to 26 vote, sending that
bill to the Senate for consideration.16 The TRUST Act would have modified California’s Secure
Communities MOA by requiring that communities wishing to participate in the program “opt in”
with a vote by the local political body, and would also have prohibited the pre-conviction sharing
5
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of fingerprints.17 Lawmakers are currently revising that act following DHS’s August 2011
cancellation of all Secure Communities MOAs.
On June 1, 2011, New York State suspended its participation in Secure Communities. In a letter
explaining that decision, Mylan Denerstein, Counsel to Governor Andrew Cuomo, stated that
the program was “compromising public safety by deterring witnesses to crime and others from
working with law enforcement.”18
On June 3, 2011, Massachusetts indicated its intent not to enter into a memorandum of
agreement with ICE to participate in Secure Communities. In its letter indicating that intent, the
state focused on the conflict between the program’s stated goal of identifying and removing
“aliens who are convicted of a serious criminal offense and are subject to removal,” and the
reality of the program’s implementation. The letter stated that “only about 1 in 4 of those
deported since the inception of Boston’s pilot participation in Secure Communities were
convicted of a serious crime and more than half of those deported were identified as ‘non
criminal.’”19
On June 7, 2011, the Los Angeles City Council voted 11 to 1 to support state legislation that
would limit participation with Secure Communities. The City Council resolution pointed to the
increasing number of localities choosing to opt out of the program, the program’s financial and
social costs, its “direct contradiction” with LAPD policy, and the “concern that the Secure
Communities program has been deployed without adequate notice and without [localities’]
consultation or consent.”20
On September 7, 2011, Cook County, Illinois passed an ordinance requiring that the Sheriff of
Cook County “decline ICE detainer requests unless there is a written agreement with the federal
government by which all costs incurred by Cook County in complying with the ICE detainer shall
be reimbursed.” The ordinance further bars county officials from giving ICE agents access to
individuals in county facilities unless county officials have a “legitimate law enforcement
purpose that is not related to the enforcement of immigration laws.”21
On October 18, 2011, Santa Clara County passed a second resolution related to Secure
Communities, this one focused on ICE detainer requests. The resolution forbids the honoring of
all detainer requests until “there is a prior written agreement with the federal government by
which all costs incurred by the County in complying with the ICE detainer shall be reimbursed.”
Even where there is such an agreement, the resolution authorizes law enforcement officials to
honor those requests only when the individual has been “convicted of a serious or violent felony
offense for which he or she is currently in custody,” or “has been convicted of a serious or violent
felony within 10 years of the request, or was released after having served a sentence for a serious
or violent felony within 5 years of the request, whichever is later.” The resolution also forbids
County officials from honoring ICE detainer requests to individuals younger than 18 years of
age, and forbids County officials from giving ICE agents access to County facilities without “a
legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not related to the enforcement of immigration
laws.”22
6
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On October 19, 2011, Mayor Gray of Washington, D.C., signed an executive order limiting that
city’s police and public safety officials from complying with ICE detainer requests.23 The
following month, all 13 D.C. Council members co-sponsored a bill to restrict ICE detainers to 24
hours, rather than the presumptive 48 hours.24
On November 22, 2011, New York City Mayor Bloomberg signed legislation limiting the use of
New York Police Department resources to honor ICE detainers except in narrow
circumstances.25 The legislation specifically found that “more than 50% of the inmates in
[Department of Corrections] custody with immigration detainers had no prior convictions at
all.”26
On December 1, 2011, Los Angeles Mayor Villaraigosa wrote a letter to California Governor Jerry
Brown urging him to suspend California’s participation with Secure Communities. Mayor
Villaraigosa’s letter expressed concern about the community costs of “entangling agencies like
the LAPD in immigration enforcement.” The letter also pointed to deportations of “community
members with no criminal background,” with the result that “thousands of US citizen children
have been placed in foster care due to their parents’ deportations.” Finally, Mayor Villaraigosa
lamented what he saw as ICE’s failure to proceed “in an open, transparent manner” by
implementing—and then rescinding—California’s Memorandum of Agreement activating the
program, and by using the program to deport people “who pose no discernible threat to public
safety.”27
On December 14, 2011, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a resolution supporting
the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department and Juvenile Probation Department policy restricting
use of local funds for ICE detainers.28 Explaining his vote, Supervisor Eric Mar, author of the
resolution, stated that the program “doesn’t make communities safer.”29
Most recently, on December 16, 2011, Los Angeles area Congressional Representatives Judy
Chu, Laura Richardson, Xavier Becerra, and Lucille Roybal-Allard wrote a letter to the Los
Angeles City Council and Board of Supervisors, urging them to “immediately adopt a policy
which would mitigate the impact of [Secure Communities] on public safety and the rights of
[their] California constituents.” The letter focused on what the representatives saw as a “wedge”
that the program drives “between Los Angeles law enforcement and immigrant communities,”
and on the illegal detention of native born Americans in Los Angeles County. The
representatives stressed that “ICE has made clear that immigration detainers are voluntary
requests” that a locality need not honor.30
E.

ICE’s Response

In response to growing national pressure, ICE began a publicity campaign focused on
prosecutorial discretion. All law enforcement agencies engage in some form of prosecutorial
discretion by focusing their enforcement resources on certain individuals rather than others. In
a memorandum dated March 2, 2011, ICE Director John Morton stated that because the agency
7
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“only has resources to remove approximately 400,000 aliens per year, less than 4 percent of the
estimated illegal alien population in the United States,” it should prioritize the deportation of
certain types of immigrants. In descending order of priority, the memo emphasized the
deportation of (1) “aliens who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety,” (2)
“recent illegal entrants,” and (3) “fugitive aliens” who are “subject to a final order of removal and
abscond, fail to deport, or intentionally obstruct immigration controls.”31
Despite the publicity surrounding the memo, ICE continued to push for the deportation of
people who did not fit into those enforcement priorities. Isaura Garcia’s case provided a
particularly poignant example. In early May 2011, Ms. Garcia called 911 to seek the LAPD’s help
while she was being assaulted by her boyfriend. Due to confusion at the scene, LAPD officers
arrested her and took her fingerprints. Because of Secure Communities, Ms. Garcia’s
fingerprints were run through federal immigration databases, and ICE placed her in deportation
proceedings. ICE did not suspend those proceedings until after national media reported on the
case.32
In May 2011, DHS announced that the Office of the Inspector General would investigate Secure
Communities for allegations of racial profiling and selective enforcement.33
On June 17, 2011, ICE Director Morton issued another memorandum on prosecutorial
discretion, again stating that ICE agents should prioritize the deportation of individuals who
pose a threat to national security, convicted criminals, and repeat immigration offenders. This
memo stated in greater detail what factors ICE agents should weigh when determining whether
to exercise discretion.34
States and localities complained that the new memoranda did not appear to be implemented on
the ground, and several states cancelled their MOAs with ICE. ICE responded on August 5, 2011,
by terminating all 40 MOAs it had executed with states up to that point, stating that the
agreements were “not required to activate or operate Secure Communities,” and that the
program would continue without agreements in place. This announcement directly contradicted
earlier ICE assurances to states and localities.35
On November 10, 2011, the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), a nonpartisan,
not-for-profit organization, published a report analyzing implementation of the prosecutorial
discretion memoranda. The report stated that “in the majority of offices ICE agents, trial
attorneys and supervisors admitted that they had not implemented the memoranda and there
had been no changes in policy or practice.”36
On November 17, 2011, ICE announced that it would undertake a case-by-case review of most
pending cases to determine whether or not they fit into ICE’s enforcement priorities.37 Any
results of this review are, as of now, unclear.
A recent report in the New York Times confirmed AILA’s suggestion that despite publicity
surrounding the ICE policy announcements, ICE officers are largely rejecting the discretion that
8
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the new policies demand they apply. The report states that the national ICE officers union has
gone so far as to forbid its members from attending a training on use of such discretion.38

II. CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT IN LOS ANGELES: THE
HUMAN COST OF SECURE COMMUNITIES
Despite growing controversy and significant questions about its implementation, effects, and
costs, police departments and ICE continue to cooperate to implement Secure Communities
across the City and County of Los Angeles. As described above, ICE has attempted to assure
states and localities that the program will lead to minimal harm—first, by promising states and
localities that the program was optional and then by publicizing its use of prosecutorial
discretion.
Interviews with Los Angeles County residents held in immigration detention facilities reveal the
misplaced priorities of Secure Communities. The detainees we interviewed generally fell into the
following categories: (1) Los Angeles County residents never convicted of any crimes, who are
themselves victims of crimes, and who have been mistakenly identified as being convicted of
crimes; (2) residents convicted of minor crimes such as traffic offenses; and (3) residents who
have been rehabilitated and pose no threat to their communities.
These categories are, unfortunately, more the rule than the exception. The National Immigrant
Justice Center (NIJC) recently acquired immigration detainer data from ICE through a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request. The data shows that between October 1, 2008, and June 21,
2010, ICE issued 14,771 detainer requests in Los Angeles County. Of these, only a small number
were associated with any serious criminal charge. Interviews with immigrant detainees show
that even in cases where a crime is listed, the immigrant may have exceptional circumstances or
a history of rehabilitation which the data does not reveal. Moreover, over 8,000 of the detainers
in the data set listed no criminal charge at all. Some of these may merely be omissions, but
interviews with immigrant detainees suggest that a number of these cases may also be based on
false matches, pretextual arrests, or other reasons misaligned with the stated priorities of Secure
Communities.
The interview summaries below serve to illuminate the human costs of Secure Communities. All
names have been anonymized to protect the individuals, many of whom remain in detention
facilities.
A.

Non-criminals, crime victims, and cases of mistaken identity

There has been significant publicity concerning the identification of crime victims and noncriminals through Secure Communities. Though ICE has claimed that it is correcting that
problem through prosecutorial discretion, recent interviews with detainees demonstrate that in
9
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Los Angeles County Secure Communities continues to identify crime victims and residents never
convicted of any crime, leading to their detention and deportation. The program also appears to
have a serious problem with false matches—cases of mistaken identity where an individual is
mistaken for someone else with a criminal record. Recently, the ACLU of Southern California
and other legal and advocacy organizations sent letters to the Los Angeles City Council39 and
Board of Supervisors,40 highlighting instances of American citizens detained based on such false
matches. Interviews with detainees reveal that non-citizen Los Angeles County residents are also
being detained and deported on the basis of false matches through Secure Communities.
i.

TS

TS has no convictions and is not facing any criminal charges. Nevertheless, LAPD officers placed
him in ICE’s custody through Secure Communities, and he now faces deportation.
TS has lived in the United States since he was three months old, when his parents brought him
here in the mid-1980s. He is the eldest of six siblings; his four brothers and one sister are all US
citizens. He grew up and went to school in South Central Los Angeles, passing his time playing
soccer with friends. He graduated from high school and set his sights on college. When his
parents developed costly medical problems, however, TS put off his college plans to help support
his family.
TS is now engaged to EC, a woman he began dating in high school and with whom he has
remained together for most of the last 11 years. Like TS’s brothers and sister, EC is a US citizen.
She works for a school, assisting children with learning disabilities. She and TS have a four-yearold daughter, and the family regularly attends church near their home in Los Angeles.
In July 2011, several LAPD officers were chasing someone with a gun near the family’s house.
The fugitive ran through the house, and escaped out the side door. The LAPD officers stormed
in, and—apparently believing TS was the suspect—placed him under arrest. TS was detained for
a week in county jail before the police understood their error and dropped all charges. But TS
then learned that ICE had put a “hold” on his release. TS found himself transferred to immigrant
detention, far from his family, and placed in removal proceedings.
TS had had no prior contact with ICE until August 2011 when he was placed in removal
proceedings. Nevertheless, ICE agents repeatedly demanded that he sign a stipulated removal
order that would fast-track his deportation.41 They told him that there was no way he would be
able to bond out, and that he would surely be deported. TS refused.
On last contact with TS, he was still detained by ICE, hoping that the Immigration Judge would
allow him to bond out so that he could be reunited with his fiancée and baby daughter.
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ii.

GK

GK is a crime victim. He has been in the United States for 13 years, and has no criminal
convictions. His arrest—a result of a language barrier with police officers—triggered an ICE
detainer request through Secure Communities. After the LAPD continued to detain him without
criminal charges, he was picked up by ICE and placed under their custody.
GK entered the United States in 1998. In August 2011, he was invited to a birthday party. When
he arrived at the house where he thought the birthday party would be held, someone hit him in
the ribs with a metal pipe and covered his mouth with a drugged rag. When he awoke, he
realized that his personal possessions had been stolen. Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived
and began questioning him. The police did not speak Spanish and GK did not speak English, and
the resulting confusion led to his arrest. After he was transferred to ICE custody, friends told GK
that the muggers knew about his arrest and had proceeded to burglarize his apartment.
GK originally came to the United States from Central America to flee a gang that killed his uncle
in 1997. These same men threatened GK and shot at him on a deserted road before he fled in
1998. Due to Secure Communities, GK has lost nearly all of his possessions and faces the
likelihood that ICE will deport him to a country where he fears for his life.
iii.

ME

ME is a father of three children. He has been in the United States for 13 years. In October 2011,
he lost his passport and identification. By November, he was in immigration detention and
facing deportation wearing someone else’s name on the wristband all detainees must wear.
ME works at a bar in Los Angeles. In November 2011, his boss was having a birthday celebration
and asked ME to have quick drink with him before going home. At 4:30 AM, ME shared one
drink with his boss and drove home. As he got on the freeway, a sheriff’s officer pulled him over.
The officer smelled alcohol on his breath and took him to the station.
ME arrived at the sheriff’s station at 5 AM. Sheriff’s officers told him that he would be released
in five hours because his blood alcohol level was below the legal limit, and because it was his
first arrest. ME called his wife and told her that he would be heading home by that afternoon.
But by 8 PM, officers told ME that he was being detained because of an ICE hold.
ME’s detention was a direct result of a false match through Secure Communities. ME shares a
first and last name with a man from Texas with an outstanding warrant. However, ME has never
been to Texas, nor does he share a maiden name with the man from Texas. Regardless, ICE
officials interrogated ME at least six times over the next three days, and repeatedly pressured
him to sign a voluntary departure form. ME explained to the officials that they were making a
mistake and that he would gladly sign a voluntary departure form if the name on it were correct.
The officers ignored him and sent him to a detention center.
11
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iv.

SL

SL has lived in the United States for 11 years. He was stopped for a minor traffic violation. He
was set to be released shortly after his arrest, but due to a mistaken fingerprint match through
Secure Communities he is now in immigration detention waiting for his removal hearing.
In November 2011, SL watched a boxing match with his friend. Afterwards, they went out to a
nightclub together. SL made an improper left turn into the parking lot, and an LAPD officer
pulled him over. The officer asked SL to take a breathalyzer test. When the machine showed he
was below the legal limit, the officer asked SL to retake the test at the police station. SL agreed.
LAPD officers told SL that he would be released in five hours. His blood alcohol level was low
and this was his first arrest. A few hours later, however, LAPD officers told SL that he would be
transferred to ICE custody because his fingerprint triggered an ICE hold.
SL has never used false identification, and he does not recognize the name associated with his
fingerprint. At the detention center his identification wristband contains the wrong identity
information. On last contact, SL was waiting for his family to send him financial records and
proof of residence so that he would not be deported under the wrong name.

B.

People convicted of minor, non-violent crimes such as traffic offenses

In fiscal year 2011, only about 20 percent of individuals detained through Secure Communities
were so-called “level 1” offenders—people charged with or convicted of more serious crimes.42 Of
the rest, many were charged with or convicted of much less serious crimes, including nonviolent crimes and traffic offenses. The result of granting ICE detainer requests for such
individuals is that people convicted of minor crimes, such as driving without a license, could
face deportation.
i.

GB

GB is a high school student who was placed in removal proceedings after being convicted of
traffic offenses.
GB’s father was murdered when GB was a small child in Mexico. Because of his father’s debts,
GB and his family had to move from place to place to avoid incurring violent reprisals from
angry creditors. He began working to help support his mother and siblings when he was just
eight years old. At age 11, his arm was badly mangled when it was sucked into a conveyor belt at
the fruit processing facility at which he was working.
At age 15, GB came to California to gain an education that would allow him to find a job that
relied on his mind, rather than his arms. He taught himself English, and his grades steadily
improved at his Los Angeles high school. He got a part-time job, and bought a car with the
12
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money. One day he took his friend for a ride. He sped, and ran through a red light. An LAPD
officer pulled him over, and arrested him when he saw that GB had no license. GB was charged
with driving without a license and other traffic offenses, and after pleading guilty to those
charges, he expected to be released on parole. He was unaware that ICE had issued a detainer
request to the LAPD through Secure Communities until ICE officers met him upon his release,
brought him to an immigration detention center, and placed him in removal proceedings.

C.

People who are rehabilitated, and are not a threat to their
communities

One stated purpose of Secure Communities is to protect public safety by facilitating the
deportation of those who pose a danger to their communities. Many people deported through
the program, however, have rehabilitated themselves and pose no danger to their communities.
ICE’s insistence on deporting such people is evidence of its intent to use any police contact for
the purposes of deportation, even when the individuals pose no threat.
i.

CQ

CQ has lived in the United States since 1983, and has been a Legal Permanent Resident since
1993. Though he has now given up drinking alcohol, found religion, and began a new life, ICE
has focused on his past mistakes and is moving to deport him.
CQ has worked as a mechanic since 1989, using a large portion of his income to support his
mother, who is a US citizen. He has five children with VG, who has remained his partner for
many years. For much of his adult life, however, he struggled with alcohol addiction. As a
consequence of this addiction, he was convicted of several substance-related crimes. He worked
to better himself during his time in jail, eventually obtaining his GED as well as other
educational certificates. After a relapse in 2005, CQ was convicted of a minor domestic violence
charge. Feeling that his locale was a trigger for his alcoholism, CQ decided to move out of state;
though he knew the move would violate his probation, he felt that he could beat his addiction
only by changing his environment.
In 2006, CQ moved to another state to live with his aunts and cousins. While there, he began to
join his family at church. He soon committed his life to religion, completely swearing off alcohol.
He has stayed true to his commitment and has had no alcohol since 2006.
In 2010, CQ received word that his mother had become gravely ill. As her only son, CQ felt
responsible to take care of her. He drove back to California, moved in with his mother, and
began nursing her back to health. One day, while driving a friend’s car that he was fixing, he was
pulled over for a broken tail light. When the arresting officer ran his fingerprints, CQ’s probation
violation became apparent. Instead of paying the price for the probation violation, the LAPD
kept him in custody under an immigration detainer until ICE officers transported him to a
detention center.
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On last contact with CQ, he had been detained for a full year. His detention, separation from his
ailing mother, and looming deportation have caused CQ to suffer from a severe depression, as
well as various physical illnesses.
ii.

JP

JP is a father of five with a sixth child on the way. He has been in the United States for 12 years.
JP has a single DUI conviction from 2007. In the years that followed he neglected to complete
his required DUI rehabilitation program. As a result, a warrant was issued against him. In
August of 2011 he was detained through Secure Communities. His arrest triggered an ICE hold
and he was sent to immigration detention.
JP arrived here in 1999. In the years that followed, he established his life in the United States.
He began working in construction. He met and fell in love with MP. She had four children from
a previous relationship, whom he has raised as his own. When he was transferred to ICE
custody, JP and MP were expecting their second child together and planning their wedding.
The children are bright and excel academically. With great pride, JP recounted that his oldest
son had placed in the top three of a statewide mathematics competition for two years in a row.
But he says that he does not have the children visit him at the detention center because he does
not want them to see him in prison.
JP's detention has caused his family great distress. He is the sole breadwinner for the family. His
wife is pregnant and unable to work. But due to JP's detention through Secure Communities,
they will not be able to pay rent and his family may need to move.
iii.

BR

BR is a father of five and a Legal Permanent Resident. He has been in the United States for 21
years. Other than a single drug conviction, he has no criminal record.
BR entered the United States in 1990. His mother filed a family visa petition on his behalf in
1992. In the years after he entered the US, BR graduated from high school in Los Angeles. He
began attending a church near downtown Los Angeles with his family. Eventually, he met his
wife. She was a US citizen and, through their marriage, he became a legal permanent resident.
In the years that followed, BR and his wife built a home together. They had five children. BR
worked hard and never got in trouble with the law. Unfortunately, BR's wife developed a
terminal illness in 2010 and passed away. All of BR's children began receiving psychological
treatment at that time. He was arrested for possession of marijuana, which he was using to
overcome his depression after the death of his wife. His arrest triggered an ICE hold through
Secure Communities and he was sent to a detention center.
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Now, BR's children may be left without a father shortly after losing their mother. BR's mother
currently cares for the children, but she has serious health problems that make caretaking very
difficult.

III. COSTS TO LOS ANGELES
Secure Communities exacts a heavy toll on Los Angeles, in addition to the costs imposed on
individual immigrants. Compliance with the program is expensive for local law enforcement
agencies, entailing increased booking costs, detention costs, and costs associated with
compensating victims of civil rights violations.
Compliance with Secure Communities also comes at a great cost to local communities. The
deportation of immigrant parents leaves many US citizen children in foster care. Moreover, the
increase in deportation rates through Secure Communities has had the unintended consequence
of decreasing public safety: immigration duties drain police time and resources, and local
immigration enforcement undermines police-community relationships and discourages crime
reporting.
A.

Law Enforcement Costs

Secure Communities strains city budgets and local communities. Most directly, local
governments are forced to shoulder the burden of booking costs, immigration detainers, and the
cost of compensating victims of civil rights violations through settlements and lawsuits. Perhaps
the highest monetary costs to local governments come from ICE detainers. The Federal
Government reimburses local governments for only a small fraction of detention costs. The
Department of Justice’s State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) disburses grants to
law enforcement agencies for costs of jailing “criminal aliens,” but only reimburses city, county,
and state jails for certain types of inmates.43 SCAAP pays for inmates who are jailed for four or
more consecutive days and have been convicted of a felony or second misdemeanor. Localities
are responsible for the costs of jailing all other immigrants. As detailed above, Secure
Communities leads to the detention of many immigrants never convicted of a felony or of
multiple misdemeanors.
Local participation in federal immigration programs also results in substantially higher costs for
local jails and prisons. A recent letter from legal and advocacy organizations to the Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors regarding Secure Communities estimated that between October 1,
2008, and June 21, 2010, Los Angeles County spent $60,138,078 to voluntarily detain people at
ICE’s request.44 These figures were based on the ICE detention data acquired by NIJC and
discussed above.
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Aside from the defined costs of arresting and detaining immigrants, local governments should
also expect to shoulder the costs associated with compensating victims of civil rights violations
that occur through the program. A detainer gives ICE a maximum of 48 hours to gain custody of
an individual. ICE frequently fails to gain custody of the individual within 48 hours, however,
leading to costly litigation. For example, in 2007 the City of New York settled a detention case
for $145,000 after the plaintiff was held on an ICE hold for 35 days.45 More recently,
Washington State settled a similar case for damages of $35,000.46
The size of these settlements is significant given the program’s error rate. A recent study by the
Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy at the University of California,
Berkeley Law School found that Secure Communities has an error rate of 1.6 percent with
respect to US citizens.47 At that rate, approximately 3,600 US citizens have been apprehended
by ICE from the inception of the program through April 2011.48 The report does not have similar
data on the error rate for detained non-citizens, although our interviews with detained
immigrants indicate that many have been apprehended using incorrect identification
information as well. Such cases might also lead to civil damages lawsuits.
B.

Community Costs

When local law enforcement agencies cooperate with federal immigration officials, communities
bear additional costs. Local governments must bear the burden of providing foster care for
children whose parents are deported through Secure Communities. The Applied Research
Center recently released a report entitled “Shattered Families” which sheds some light on the
costs of local immigration enforcement to family unity and foster care systems.49 The report
found that nationally at least 5,100 children currently live in foster care due to the deportation
of their parents.50 Moreover, the report estimates that based on current detention and
deportation rates, the number will grow by at least 15,000 in the next five years.51
Communities also bear the costs of diverted law enforcement resources. Immigration duties
drain police time and resources. For that reason, the Major Cities Chiefs Police Association
(MCC) has come out against local immigration enforcement, stating that “[s]ince the creation of
the Homeland Security Department, federal funding for major city police departments has been
greatly reduced,” and “[l]ocal communities and agencies have even fewer resources to devote to
such an effort than the federal government given all the numerous other demands on local
police departments.”52
In addition, local immigration enforcement undermines police-community relationships and
discourages crime reporting. The International Police Chiefs Association issued a report in 2007
stating that “law enforcement simply cannot function adequately without the support and
cooperation of the populations it serves. An adequate law enforcement outreach and response to
prevent fear, crime and disorder requires cooperation and understanding of all.” 53 Secure
Communities discourages immigrant communities from interacting with local police because of
their fear of deportation. As former Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton stated in a 2009
op-ed to the Los Angeles Times, “My officers can’t prevent or solve crimes if victims or witnesses
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are unwilling to talk to them because of the fear of being deported. . . . Criminals are the biggest
benefactors when immigrants fear the police. We can’t solve crimes that aren’t reported because
the victims are afraid to come forward to the police.”54
Finally, reports indicate that Secure Communities increases the use of racial profiling by local
police. In jurisdictions where an unusually high percentage of deportations under Secure
Communities are of non-criminals, the numbers suggest that police may be arresting Latinos for
pretextual reasons.55 One recent report produced by the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on
Law and Policy at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law found that “Latinos
comprise 93% of individuals arrested through Secure Communities though they only comprise
77% of the undocumented population in the United States.”56

IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Secure Communities appears to represent a choice to punish with deportation almost anyone
who has had contact with law enforcement, without regard to the severe social and economic
consequences of such a policy.
ICE has failed to implement Secure Communities consistent with its stated purpose, at
enormous costs to the City and County of Los Angeles. The program appears to represent ICE’s
assumption that any contact immigrants have with law enforcement is evidence that they are a
threat to the community. Thus, it is not surprising that the vast majority of those deported
under the program are not dangerous criminals. The program was designed to bring into ICE
custody all those who have contact with law enforcement regardless of the actual threat they
may pose. This is an irreparable structural flaw in the program that cannot be corrected with
remedies created for individual detainees, such as a telephonic hotline57 or prosecutorial
discretion. While ICE presents Secure Communities as a benefit to community safety, in reality
the program creates mistrust between communities and law enforcement, increases racial
profiling in policing, and increases social harms when families are separated through
deportation.
Localities and states around the country have repeatedly complained of ICE’s
misrepresentations concerning the program, as well as the costs and harms it places on them.
Because of those concerns, some counties have recently passed ordinances limiting their
participation in the program. On September 7, 2011, for example, Cook County passed an
ordinance drastically limiting ICE’s access to detainees. On October 18, 2011, the Santa Clara
County Board of Supervisors passed a similar resolution. Localities may pass such ordinances
because detainer requests carry with them no legal duty that they be honored, a fact confirmed
by federal courts, state and county counsel, and ICE officials themselves.58
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Given the documented costs to communities, families, and individuals, as well as ICE’s failure to
accurately represent the program, we recommend that the County of Los Angeles act to limit its
participation in Secure Communities.
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